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DRUNKENNESS AS AN EXTENUATION IN CASES
OF MURDER.
TiiE relation of drunkenness to moral agency is one of those
vexed questions with regard to which the opinions of moralists
have ever been at variance, and upon which their conclusions are
to-day not more harmonious than they were when the matter may
have first attracted their attention. Jurists, too, have differed
very widely among themselves as to the degree of guilt which may
attach to deeds perpetrated by agents who had voluntarily yielded
to an appetite whose indulgence they well knew would destroy
their reasoning powers and rob them of all prudence and selfcontrol. So great disagreement have the laws of different times
and of different nations shown upon this question that we may find
intoxication variously regarded as leading to acts done under its
influence-almost every shade of guilt, from that slight degree
of moral laxity of which the laws of most countries take no notice,
to the baseness and turpitude which would render it an aggravation of the offence. Accordingly as the spirit of the age upon
which their lot was cast inclined toward the doctrine that "mercy
and reformation," rather than "severity and annihilation," should
be the rule of society in dealing with its criminals, mankind have
been disposed to look upon drunkenness as an excuse, a matter
of indifference or an aggravation of guilt. In England, for instance, in the days of Lord COKE (4 Bl. Com. 25),'when all the
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higher species of crimes were punished with death in one form
or other, intoxication was held an aggravation of whatever offence
a criminal might commit, and the justice might take account of it
as ground for increasing the severity of the punishment ; though
no additional penalty was inflicted for the drunkenness itself, as
was the case with a law of Pittacus, dictator of Mitylgng, which
provided that lie who committed a crime when drunk should be
doubly punished, first for the crime itself, and again for having
brought himself into a state of ebriety. Through a period of many
years later, in the criminal jurisprudence of England, no account
whatever was made of the fact that a person at the time of committing an unlawful act was deprived of the use of his reason and
prudence by strong drink. It could neither modify the nature of
the offence nor affect the penalty which should follow it.
Within the last half century, however, the harshness of the
English law, in this respect, has been considerably mitigated, and
the question of drunkenness in cases of homicide has been taken
into consideration, not only in determining whether or not there
were sufficient provocation to reduce the crime to manslaughter,
but also in the inquiry as to intent and malice, where no provocation whatever existed. Thus judges have charged that "drunkenness may be taken into consideration, in cases where what the law
deems sufficient provocation has been given; because the question
is, in such cases, whether the fatal act is to be attributed to the
passion of anger excited by the previous provocation, and that
passion is more easily excited in a person when in a state of intoxication than when sober :" Rex v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817. And
in a later case the justice said that "such a state of drunkenness
may no doubt exist as would take away the power of forming any
specific intention :" Regina v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox 0. C. 55; and
this would seem to indicate that the degree of guilt must necessarily be less in a case of homicide happening under such circumstances, than where it was wilful, deliberate and with intent to
destroy life.
The doctrine of this latter decision is that upon which are
founded the rulings under our -various state statutes which divide
murder into two degrees, according as the killing is wilful, deliberate, premeditated and malicious, or as it is unattended by some
of these attributes. In many of the states where such distinction
has been made by statutory enactment, it has been held that murder
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done by a man in a state of intoxication so great as to render him
incapable of forming a design, shall be murder in the second degree;
provided, of course, a premeditated design of murder did not exist
in the mifll of the criminal previous to his becoming intoxicated.
For "if a man designing a homicide drinks to intoxication, and
commits the crime in that condition, he is guilty of murder the
same as if he were sober:" Smith v. Conmonwcalthi, I Day. (Ky.)
224. Thus it was said in the late Pennsylvania ease of Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 38 Leg. Intelligencer 13, following a number
of similar decisions in the same state (Ifeenan v. Commonwealth,
8 Wright 55; Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewster 546; ffellj v.
Conmnmonwealth, 1 Grant's Cases 484; Commonwealth v. Crosher, 1
Brewster 349; Commonwealth v. Miller, 17 Leg. Int. 276 ; Warren v. commonwealth, I Wright 45): "If a man's intoxication is
so great as to render him unable to form a wilful, deliberate and
premeditated design to kill, or of judging of his acts and their
legitimate consequences, then it reduces what would otherwise be
murder of the first degree to murder of the second degree." And
like rulings are to be found in other states: People v. Rarris, 29
Cal. 678 ; Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 664; Commonwealth
v. Jones, 1 Leigh (Va.) 612; People v. H1ammill, 2 Parker C. R.
(N. Y.) 223; State v. Harlow, 21 Miss. 446; State v. Bullock, 13
Ala. 413; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136.
These statutes and the rulings under them do not change in the
least the nature of the crime known as murder, but only provide
that one species of it shall be called murder in the first degree and
shall be visited with a punishment more severe than that assigned
to a less malignant form of killing, to which the name murder in
the second degree is given. So that, whatever was murder at the
common law, with all its forms of implied malice, its doctrine of
momentary deliberation and its disregard of voluntarily produced
madness, is murder to-day. In Ifeighorst v. State, 7 Md. 412, it
was said: " the statute does not create a new offence, but merely
establishes a rule to guide the courts in awarding punishment."
Such interpretation has abundant authority: .finn. v. Lessmg, 16
Minn. 75; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 899 ; State v. Mrerrill, 54 Me.
408; Commonwealth v. Flanagan,7 W..& S.415; Green v. Gommonwealth, 94 Mass. 155; Gehrke v. The State, 13 Texas. 568;
v.Mrurray,
Commonwealth v. Miller, I Virg. Cas. 310; People Y.
10 Cal. 309; Fitzgerroldv. The People, 37"N. Y. 413; Mitchellv.
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The State, 8 Yerg. 514 ; The State v. Johnson, 8 Iowa 525. The
effect, then, of intoxication is simply to lessen the severity of the punishment that shall follow the crime which by the common law and
by our law is defined to be "the unlawful killing, by a person of
sound memory and discretion, of any reasonable creature in being
and in' the peace of the Commonwealth, with malice aforethought,
either express or implied." In this we have practically followed the
rule of the civil law, which provides that capital punishment should
be remitted where the crime had been occasioned by ebriety: 4
Blackstone's Com. 26. An attempt to assign to it any different
effect only involves us in hopeless confusion, as strict reasoning
upon the subject would almost lead to the conclusion, that a wrongful act done by one who is in such a state as to be unable to form
any deliberate design or to judge of the reasonable consequences
of his actions, should be wholly excused, and the penalties of
drunkenness merely inflicted; especially so, when we remember
that all forms of insanity are, to a greater or less extent, brought
about by the patient's own indiscretions, only more remotely and
by slower degrees than in the case of common drunkenness. And,
indeed, such was the view taken of the matter in France, a few.
years since, where juries in several instances acquitted prisoners
on the ground of intoxication; the only way in which .they could
afford relief being by entire exculpation. For as the penal code
says nothing about intoxication, but declares insanity without distinction of any kind to be a ground of exoneration from guilt,
it was believed that this should be made to include the temporary
insanity produced by strong drink. Such reasoning, however,
would in its practical effects be too dangerous to the communlity.
Next, as to the degree of intoxication which should be permitted
to reduce the grade of the offence, and thus remit the death penalty. In the practical determination of this question is found
much difficulty, and jurymen err quite as frequently as they arrive
at reasonable and just conclusions. It is too often the case that
juries conduct themselves in their deliberations as if the law were
that drunkenness simply, without regard to the character and
degree of it, reduces the grade of the crime, and as if they were
privileged to return a veroict of murder in the second degree in
case they find that the defendant, when he gave the fatal blow, was
at all under the influence of liquor. The evidence in almost every
case of felonious homicide discloses the fact, as a matter of course,
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that the prisoner at some time during the day or evening upon
which the deed was done had been in a drinking saloon and had
taken a dram or two, and on the strength of this a verdict of murder in the second degree is brought in. Some of the most heinous
cases of wilful and malicious murder thus go unwhipt of justice,
the criminal is sent to reside for a few years in the state prison,
and is then again let loose upon society, prepared for a repetition
of the offence, should it suit the purposes of his depraved life.
One wrong determination gives rise to another, and precedent and
example are supposed by the minds of jurymen to justify conclusions the most unreasonable. Hence this mockery is continued
until public sentiment becomes aroused by the manifest failure of
justice, when the pendulum is likely to swing back as far on the
side of severity as it had formerly been raised toward leniency and
mercy. But strict attention to the character and degree of the
drunkenness will alone insure a just verdict; for, as was said in
Commonwealth v. .Fletcler,above cited, there never was a greater
mistake or a greater libel on the administration of justice than to
suppose that drunkenness is an excuse for crime; and it is not all
drunkenness that can be permitted to reduce the grade of the
offence. On the contrary, we have the authority of Commonwealth
v. Hart, 2 Brewster 546, for saying that intoxication short of a
destruction of reason is an aggravation of, rather than an excuse
for, crime.
Now, insanity produced by the use of alcoholic liquors may be
either permanent or temporary, involuntary or voluntary. Permanent, settled insanity, as it exists in the disease to which the
name delirium tremens is given, must of course affect moral and
legal responsibility in the same way as any other species of madness, and wholly exculpates the patient who may be so unfortunate
as to commit violence when in the throes of its terrible paroxysms.
See Wharton's Anerican Criminal Law, Book I., § 33, where the subject is fully treated and the leading eases collected and reviewed.
Another form of insanity from this same cause, which would seem
to be wholly beyond the control of its victim, is that called dipsomania, in which there comes upon the patient periodically "an
impulse which he has not the power of resisting," that hurries him
to an excessive indulgence in strong drink. As soon as this irresistible craving has been satisfied and the effect passed off, he
becomes again a most temperate and abstemious person, until the
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period for another fit has arrived, when the same course ensues:
Ray's Med. Jurisp. of Insanity, § 550.
We come now to voluntary, wilful drunkenness, which writers on
medical jurisprudence usually distinguish as being of three distinct grades or degrees. The first is that ia which the inebriate's
memory is unimpaired and his command of self not less perfect than at other times. Thus far he is perfectly capable of forming or carrying out any design with the utmost deliberation and
through the promptings of every form of malice, having control
of all his faculties, some of them being qnly more vivacious than
usual; hence his moral and legal responsibility is not affected.
It is to this state of intoxication, we presume, that reference is
made in such cases as Pennsylvaniav. .2fcFall, t Add. 255, where
it was said: "Drunkenness does not incapacitate a man for forming a premeditated design of murder, but frequently suggests it."
Again, in People v. Robinson, Parker (N. Y.) Cr. R. 235 : "If 4
drunken man retains mind enough to plan and execute a crime, it
is enough to subject him to legal responsibility." In Shannahan
v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush (Ky.) 464: "Voluntary drunkenness
that merely excites the passions and stimulates men to the commission of crimes, neither excuses the offence nor mitigates the punishment."

In the second stage of intoxication, all the senses have become
enfeebled or distorted. The victim finds it impossible to .see
straight or to hear distinctly without a special effort, what is said
to him. His memory fails him just when he needs it most and his
perverted judgment leads him into all sorts of absurdities. He conducts himself as if the present only were his, having little regard for
the consequences of his acts or for what the next moment may
bring forth.
The third and last stage is that in which the individual loses
all consciousness of things about him. Reason is gone and his
senses so blunted as to be of little use to him. As to the legal
responsibility of one in this latter state no inquiry is necessary,
for there can be little possibility of one who is "1dead drunk"
injuring anybody.
The second and the beginning of the third periods seem to be
the degrees of voluntary drunkenness which may be allowed to
reduce murder from thQ first to the second degree. This, alone
can be said to be a state of intoxication which renders a man

